ABSTRACT. We present a representation for reasoning and planning with an incomplete state description (open-world) called PSIPLAN-S. The presented formalism has several properties critical for application domains with a large degree of incompleteness in the state description, particularly, in domains with a large or unknown set of all objects. The formalism offers (1) considerably expressive state and goal description language, that includes limited universal quantification, (2) representation of sensing actions and knowledge goals, (3) a correct and complete state update procedure, and (4) complete reasoning within a substantial subset of the language. The approach is illustrated by examples from a working system. KEYWORDS: automated planning, planning with incomplete information and sensing, reasoning about actions.
Introduction
Planning with correct but incomplete information and with or without sensing actions has been addressed by numerous researchers, offering several approaches for knowledge representation and reasoning with an incomplete state description (e.g., (Scherl et al., 1993; Moore, 1985; Etzioni et al., 1997; Petrick et al., 2002; Son et al., 2001; Levesque et al., 1997; Eiter et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2005; Thielscher, 2005) ).
One major challenge of open-world planning is the computational complexity of reasoning with incomplete information. The PSIPLAN-S framework, which we present in this paper, occupies a unique niche by offering: (1) a logic of knowledge that has sufficient expressive power for a large array of applications, (2) polynomial time algorithms to determine entailment and other key relationships for a large subset of the language, and (3) completeness of reasoning for a large subset of the languageand we conjecture that it is complete for the entire language. We report on the logical foundations of this representation and give examples of its important properties.
We assume that the agent's knowledge is correct but incomplete and that it has a set of primitive actions available. We assume that the set of all domain objects is unknown and infinite. Domain actions change the world, have deterministic effects and do not have conditional effects. Sensing actions do not change the state of the world, but instead return information.
Our representation can be used with a variety of planning languages and planning algorithms. To date it has been used for a conformant (i.e., with incomplete information but without sensing) partial order planner (Babaian et al., 2000) , a conformant Graphplan-based planner (Carlin et al., 2005) , and a planner that interleaves planning and execution (Babaian et al., 2002) . At the core of any planning language and algorithm is the need to project or regress an agent's state of knowledge over a sequence of primitive actions. For this paper, we focus only on this core and on progression, and therefore define a planning problem to be a 3-tuple I, G, A where I is an initial knowledge base of the agent, G is a goal to achieve, described as a partial knowledge state, and A is a set of primitive actions. A plan P is an executable sequence of ground instances of elements of A. To be executable means that it can be proven that the agent will know each action's preconditions are true just before executing the action. Finally, a plan solves a planning problem if and only if it can be proven that if I is true before the first action then G is true after the last.
Parts of PSIPLAN-S have been presented in (Babaian et al., 2002; Babaian et al., 2000) , both of which addressed the use of PSIPLAN-S representation in planning algorithms. (Babaian et al., 2006) focuses on the calculus and algorithms behind PSI-PLAN -a subset of PSIPLAN-S that does not handle sensing actions and knowledge goals (conformant planning). In this paper we focus on the logical foundations of reasoning and planning with sensing actions and knowledge goals and prove properties underlying its soundness and completeness that have not been published before.
Overview of PSIPLAN-S
To illustrate the representational needs of an open-world planner that are addressed in PSIPLAN-S we present the following scenario from a real-world application called Writer's Aid (Babaian et al., 2002 ). An agent must locate and possibly download papers that contain certain keywords in their title. The agent knows nothing about any actual papers, their locations or contents. It knows about a few bibliographic websites and it can execute actions for querying these sites and downloading papers from a given location.
In order to complete its task the agent must (1) find all relevant papers from these bibliographies, (2) determine if these bibliographic collections have viewable versions of the papers, and (3) if a paper is located, download it; otherwise, try another bibliographic source. First, it must be possible to distinguish between those bibliographies known to be preferred by the user, known not to be preferred, and those about which the agent does not know the user's preference. The closed world assumption cannot be used here, so negative facts must be included in the state description. When the number of domain individuals is large or unknown, as it is in Writer's Aid due to the number of potential bibliographies and citable papers, it is impossible to represent the known negative facts without some sort of universal quantification. Moreover, when the domain is either infinite or not entirely known by the agent, reasoning with quantified propositions cannot be done by expanding each to the set of ground instances it represents.
PSIPLAN-S uses propositions called ψ-forms to represent such quantified statements and introduces a calculus of operations on ψ-forms to support automated reasoning. Formal definitions are presented in Section 3. Here we informally introduce ψ-forms and discuss their use in reasoning and planning with incomplete information.
Briefly, a ψ-form [Q( x) except {σ 1 , . . . , σ n }] represents a set of all ground instances of Q( x) except those that can be obtained using one of the substitutions σ 1 , . . . , σ n , which are substitutions on a subset of variables of x. For example,
Second, it must be possible to represent knowledge goals 1 , like identify the relevant papers recommended by the digital library of the ACM, and infer that such goals can be achieved by using a sensing action, which queries a bibliography for a list of papers related to a keyword. PSIPLAN-S uses KW-propositions to represent knowing whether a statement is true or false. For example, the goal above, as well as the effect of the sensing action is expressed with the following KW-ψ-form ψ 2 = [KW (¬InCollection(y, ACM ) ∨ ¬Rel(y, Kwrd ))],
which states that for every possible paper y, the agent knows whether this paper is in the collection of ACM and is also recommended as related to keyword Kwrd . Note that KW (p) is a shortcut for Kn(p) ∨ Kn(¬p), and therefore KW (p) is equivalent to KW (¬p). For the convenience of algorithm formulation, we use the disjunction of negated literals inside of the KW () operator instead of an equivalent conjunction of atoms.
Third, it must be possible to download all relevant papers. Thus the agent must reason about domain goals, such as having a paper stored on a hard drive. PSIPLAN-S's domain goals include atoms and universally quantified propositions represented with ψ-forms.
Furthermore, for reasons of efficiency, the agent should avoid redundant actions. There is no need to download a paper that is known to be stored on the local hard drive, and no need to sense for information already implied by the agent's knowledge base. Thus the agent needs to know what it does and does not know. PSIPLAN-S provides complete reasoning from the agent's state of knowledge about domain and knowledge goals. One of the features distinguishing PSIPLAN-S from other implemented planning formalisms is the fact that the reasoning algorithms work directly with quantified propositions and never convert them to sets of ground instances.
Another aspect contributing to non-redundancy of information gathering is the knowledge update procedure of PSIPLAN-S's, which produces a knowledge state that correctly and completely describes the set of possible worlds resulting from taking an action. This is done without actually considering all possible worlds individually. Although we do not report on it in this paper, the reasoning from an agent's state of knowledge and the state update procedure have polynomial complexity in the number and size of propositions in the agent's state of knowledge (Babaian et al., 2006) . PSIPLAN-S does not allow conditional effects and effects with universal quantification of atoms, commonly handled by many other planners (e.g. (Tu et al., 2007; Golden, 1998) ). These omissions are deliberate, since they allow PSIPLAN-S to specify the effects of the domain actions precisely, which is important for ensuring the computational properties of the knowledge updates in PSIPLAN-S, in particular, for keeping the knowledge updates correct, complete and polynomial time complex in the number of participating propositions. These properties of the state update bear on the properties of the planning algorithms, such as soundness and completeness of conformant planning and avoiding redundancy in using sensing and domain actions. We discuss the impact of conditional effects on the complexity of planning with incomplete information in (Babaian et al., 2006) .
To illustrate the difference between PSIPLAN-S and other formalisms, consider the effect of emptying a box. Such an effect can be described in a conditional form as "if object x was inside the box, then x would be outside of it". Alternatively, this effect can be described as a universally quantified statement "all objects will be outside of the box". Formulated in this way, the effect asserts what is true upon executing the action, but does not necessarily designate what exactly has changed in the world. PSIPLAN-S does not allow conditional effects and universal quantification over atoms, but as a solution to this problem it is possible to define an action of removing a single object ?x 2 from the box. The action would have a precondition "object ?x is inside the box" and an atomic effect "object ?x is not inside the box", which describes precisely the changes to the world caused by the action. While this representation is not ideal, it allows to approximate the action of emptying the box with a series of individual object removals. The benefits of the action language used in PSIPLAN-S are the computational properties that we described above.
Another difference between PSIPLAN-S and other formalisms is the absence of universally quantified positive implication goals, such as "all book objects are inside box A" (in other words, ∀x.Kn(Book(x) ⊃ In(BoxA, x)). These goals are not part 2 . note that we use ?x to denote a parameter of an action, versus x, which denotes a variable of PSIPLAN-S, because they cannot be handled naturally by its logical mechanisms. However, they can be handled if planning is interleaved with execution of partial plans, as done in Writer's Aid (Babaian et al., 2002) , by first achieving the goal of knowing the identity of all book objects, i.e. [KW (Book(x))] and then posting individual goals for all identified book objects.
Representing an agent's knowledge
Before defining the language of PSIPLAN-S formally, we define two languages that do not have quantification, L D and L K . L D is a ground domain language, used to define the state of the world. L K is a ground knowledge language, expressing the agent's knowledge of the world state in the form of ground knowledge propositions. PSIPLAN-S is an open world planning language, which includes 1) a compact representation of propositions of L K used to denote agent's knowledge of the world state and goals;
2) an action definition language.
L D and L K are not directly used in planning, because our goal is to provide a planning representation which could operate in domains where the number of objects is infinite or at least very large, and can never be fully acquired. Thus, it is impossible to enumerate all ground facts using
However, we introduce L D and L K for the purpose of defining PSIPLAN-S's semantics and proving some of its important logical properties in the rest of this section. We adopt the following standard definitions throughout the paper.
DEFINITION. -A set s of propositions is called satisfiable, if there exists a model of all propositions in s. A set s of propositions is called consistent, if there exists a proposition p such that s ⇒ p is not provable using the inference rules of the language. Otherwise, s is called inconsistent.
Furthermore, for L D , L K and PSIPLAN-S we assume an infinite number of domain constants, including propositional symbols, which denote distinct domain individuals. We use the unique names assumption on the constants and propositional symbols of the languages we define.
The alphabet of L D consists of a countable set of propositional symbols and logical connectives ¬ and ∨.
Assume a, a 1 , . . . , a n are propositional symbols. A formula in L D (also called a domain proposition ) is either 1) a, called a domain atom or 2) ¬a 1 ∨ ¬a 2 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬a n , where n ≥ 1, called a domain clause.
DEFINITION. -Domain propositions are interpreted over a set of worlds, which are standard propositional interpretations. For a world w and a domain proposition p, w(p) denotes that p is true in the world w according to the standard interpretation rules of propositional formulas. Such world w is then called a model of p.
Assuming standard propositional semantics, it is easy to see that deduction from a satisfiable set of domain propositions in L D is complete under unit clause resolution and subsumption:
To extend the completeness result to any set of propositions from L D , we only need to add the third rule (r3) a, ¬a p , where p is any domain proposition.
The propositional SOK language L K
We define L K , a language for representing the state of agent's knowledge of the world and of its own knowledge. The formulas of L K , are called knowledge propositions as defined below.
-The alphabet of L K consists of modal symbols Kn() and KW (), and the alphabet of L D .
Kn-atoms represent the agent's knowledge of the world, e.g. Kn (On(A, B) ) represents that the agent knows that block A is on block B.
KW (p) denotes that the agent knows the truth value of p, and is thus semantically equivalent to Kn(p) ∨ Kn(¬p) (note that this disjunctive formula is outside of L K ).
Semantics and entailment
We use k-states of Baral and Son (Son et al., 2001) to define the semantics of the knowledge language L K . Let W denote the set of all worlds, which are propositional interpretations over a given domain of discourse.
DEFINITION. -A k-state is a pair (w, W ), where W is a subset of W and w is an element of W . A k-state (w, W ) represents the knowledge state of an agent who actually being in the world w thinks it might be in any of the worlds of W . We are assuming that the agent's knowledge is correct, hence we require that for any k-state (w, W ), w ∈ W . The set of all possible k-states is denoted K.
The set of models of a knowledge proposition or a set of knowledge propositions from L K is denoted by α() and defined below.
In the above, and throughout this paper, assuming p = ¬a 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬a k , we use w(¬p) as a shorthand for w(a 1 ), . . . , w(a k ).
Note that according to the definition above, for each k ∈ L K , we have α(¬k) = K − α(k).
DEFINITION. -
The set of models of a set of knowledge propositions {k 1 , . . . , k m } is the intersection of the models of all k i s , i.e. α({k 1 , . . . , k 
-For two knowledge propositions or sets of knowledge propositions q and r we write q |= k r if and only if every model of q is a model of r, i.e.
q |= k r if and only if α(q) ⊆ α(r)
The following Proposition states an important property of L K that allows the reduction of the entailment between Kn-propositions to the usual propositional entailment. In particular, determining satisfiability of a set Kn-atoms is reduced to the propositional case. It also proves that in our logic an agent knows all the propositional consequences of its knowledge.
Some special cases of entailment between propositions of our logic are considered in the two propositions below. These properties are later used in establishing the soundness and completeness properties of PSIPLAN-S. Proposition 2 considers entailment between a set of Kn-atoms and a single KW-atom. Proposition 3 considers entailment between KW-atoms.
Please note that in Proposition 2 and further in the paper, we often treat disjunctive clauses as sets of literals and use set notation to describe relationships between such clauses. 
In other worlds, for a set of KW-atoms to entail another KW-atom KW (c), there must be a subset whose domain clauses produce the domain clause c when combined via the union operator. Note that when the left side consists of just a single KW-atom KW (c ), we have KW (c ) |= k KW (c) if and only if c = c.
Inference rules
The soundness of inference rules depicted in Figure 1 can be easily verified using the definition of entailment and Propositions 1-3. We conjecture, but have not shown, that this set of rules is complete for L K .
The two propositions presented later in this section establish that the rule system is complete with respect to reasoning about Kn and KW-atoms from a satisfiable set of Kn-atoms. As follows from Proposition 1, satisfiability of a set of Kn-atoms can be established by checking the consistency of the set of corresponding domain propositions. This result is essential for proving the completeness of reasoning and planning without sensing in PSIPLAN-S, since, as we define in the next section, the state of agent's knowledge is always described with a satisfiable set of Kn-atoms. The significance of the Conjecture below is that allows to limit the number of rules used by PSIPLAN-S reasoning with sensing to only 6, while the completeness of such reasoning would be retained if the conjecture holds. This is possible because of a number of assumptions and choices made in PSIPLAN-S. For instance, the syntax of PSIPLAN-S action and state descriptions, the requirement on the correctness of agent's knowledge, no information loss and complete and precise specification of action effects allow PSIPLAN-S to operate without the rules that use negated Kn-propositions. We have presented all rules here to provide a more complete description of the propositional language L K , which can be used in formalisms that do not make some of the assumptions made in PSIPLAN-S and thus may need to rely on another subset of these rules.
-s |= k Kn(r) if and only if s ⇒ Kn(r) can be derived using rules (R1) and (R2).
-s |= k KW (r) if and only if s ⇒ KW (r) can be derived using rules (R1), (R2), (R3), (R4), (R5) and (R6).
The agent's state of knowledge (SOK)
In this section we introduce other definitions and properties required in the context of planning.
DEFINITION. -An agent's state of knowledge, or SOK, is a satisfiable set of Kn atoms. The set of possible worlds corresponding to SOK s is denoted B(s) and defined as the set of all worlds in all models of s:
}, or in other words, the set of possible worlds is equivalent to the set of all worlds in which everything known to the agent is true.
We make the Closed Knows Whether Assumption, which means that for a given SOK s and for all domain propositions p, if s does not entail KW (p), i.e., s |= k KW (p), then the agent assumes that ¬KW (p).
DEFINITION. -For a SOK s we define
The set of possible worlds of s and of its closure CKWA(s) are the same, as shown next. This allows to eliminate the direct use of the negated KW-propositions in PSIPLAN-S relying on the negation as failure instead: if KW (p) cannot be established via application of rules identified in Conjecture 1, we assume ignorance about p, i.e. ¬KW (p).
ψ-forms -a compact representation
We now introduce propositions called ψ-forms that compactly represent sets of L K propositions. We define ψ-forms before introducing PSIPLAN-S fully in Section 4.
We note that in ψ-forms the KW operator is used only with a negated clause. Using KW-propositions with a conjunction of atoms inside would result in more cumbersome formulations of the theorems, while giving us no additional expressive power, since
The formula Q( x) is called the main form and has the form Kn(p( x)) or KW (p( x)) where p( x) is a disjunction of negated literals. The main form of ψ is denoted M(ψ). Each of σ 1 , . . . , σ n defines ψ's exceptions, and each exception is a substitution on a subset of variables in x.
A ψ-form may have an empty set of exceptions. In that case it has a form [Q( x)] and is called simple.
ψ-forms represent the set of all ground instantiations of the main form, except for those that can be obtained by instantiating the exceptions, as illustrated by (1) earlier and defined below.
DEFINITION. -The set of ground propositions (instances) of L K represented by a ψ-form is defined using the Inst function, where
DEFINITION. -A ψ-form with a main form that does not contain any variables and thus represents a single ground Kn or KW atom is called a singleton. When the main form contains at least one variable, we call it non-ground, or quantified.
PSIPLAN-S
We remind the reader that PSIPLAN-S assumes infinite number of distinct domain objects.
DEFINITION (PSIPLAN-S PROPOSITION)
. -A PSIPLAN-S proposition is either 1) a Kn-atom of the form Kn(a), where a is a ground atom, or 2) a Kn-ψ-form or KW-ψ-form.
We also use terms Kn-(or KW-)proposition to refer to any proposition that uses Kn (or KW).
DEFINITION (PSIPLAN-S STATE OF KNOWLEDGE -SOK). -PSIPLAN-S's State
Of Knowledge is a satisfiable set of PSIPLAN-S Kn-atoms and Kn-ψ-forms that represent agent's knowledge about the world.
DEFINITION (PSIPLAN-S GOAL
KW-ψ-forms in PSIPLAN-S are used to represent information goals and results of sensing actions. They are used in reasoning about knowledge and ignorance. Consider ψ = [KW (¬P ref Bib (x))], for example. Posted as a goal,ψ requires knowing the value of each ground instance of P ref Bib(x) , or in other words, knowing the set of preferred bibliographies. On the other hand,ψ describes the effect of a sensing action that identifies the set of all preferred bibliographies.
A negated KW-proposition ¬KW (p) represents ignorance about p. Although negated KW-propositions are not part of PSIPLAN-S, the CKWA (see Definition on page 11) allows us to conclude that p is unknown, if KW (p) cannot be deduced.
Note also that reasoning in PSIPLAN-S is done without expanding the ψ-forms into universal base, i.e. into the set of all of its ground instances.
PSIPLAN-S action language
PSIPLAN-S distinguishes two types of actions: domain actions that change the world (e.g., an action of downloading a paper from a url), and sensing actions that do not change the world but only return information about it (e.g., querying a bibliography).
Each domain action has a list of preconditions, P, identifying the conditions necessary for executability of an action, and an encoding of the effects of the action, called the assert list, A. An action precondition is a PSIPLAN-S goal, as defined above. We assume that an action is deterministic and can change the truth-value of only a finite number of atoms. Furthermore, the assert list refers to all and only those propositions that have changed their truth value as a result of action execution, thus each assert list is a set of propositions of the form Kn(a) or [Kn(¬a)], where a ∈ L D , i.e. is a ground atom. An action is executable in a world state w, if all action's preconditions are true in w.
Action RmDir(?d) of deleting an empty directory ?d, depicted in Figure 2 is an example of a PSIPLAN-S domain action. Its preconditions are a Kn-atom and a quantified Kn-ψ-form. Its assert list consists of a Kn-ψ-form denoting a single Knatom. Sensing actions also have preconditions. Effects of the sensing are specified by its knowledge list, denoted K. The propositions in K are KW-ψ-forms. After a sensing action is executed, it returns an observation list of Kn-propositions corresponding to the information that was learned, denoted ∆. When the knowledge list K of a sensing action contains a quantified KW-ψ-form, i.e. denotes a statement about all domain objects, one of the propositions of ∆ will also necessarily be a quantified ψ-form, since our assumption is that there is always a finite number of "positive" facts and representing the infinite number of "negative" facts requires quantification.
For example, QueryBib(?b, ?kwd), depicted in Figure 2 is a sensing action that identifies all papers that according to bibliography ?b are related to keyword ?kwd. The precondition requires that ?b be a preferred bibliography. The effect of this action is encoded in the knowledge list that contains a quantified ψ-form, and states that as a result of this action the set of all papers in collection of bibliography ?b that are related to keyword ?kwd in the title will be known.
Suppose after executing sensing action a = QueryBib(RI, K) with effect [KW (¬Rel(p, K) ∨ ¬InCollection(p, RI))] papers Paper 1 and Paper 2 were found as the only ones containing keyword K in their title, i.e. ∆(a) consists of the following propositions:
Reasoning in PSIPLAN-S
In this section we consider entailment in PSIPLAN-S. We first address entailment of Kn and KW propositions (representing domain and knowledge goals) from a set of PSIPLAN-S Kn-propositions. This kind of reasoning is applied when sensing actions are not included in planning, as sensing actions have KW-propositions as their effects. We show that in PSIPLAN-S reasoning about domain and knowledge goals is sound and complete; we also provide a rationale for why its complexity is polynomial. This combination of soundness, completeness and tractability is unique among all implemented open-world planning formalisms.
Furthermore, we consider entailment from a set of Kn and KW-propositions, which is used when sensing actions are applied by the planner to satisfy knowledge goals. We present the sufficient conditions for entailment in such situations and illustrate its use in planning with examples.
Reasoning without sensing actions
First, consider entailment between two simple ψ-forms, i.e. ψ-forms without exceptions. In the following Lemma and below, whenever the ⊆ sign is used to relate Kn or KW propositions, we actually mean the subset relationship between the domain literals within the parentheses that follow. For example, we would write Kn(¬P ∨ ¬Q) ⊆ Kn(¬R ∨ ¬Q ∨ ¬P ), since {¬P, ¬Q} ⊆ {¬R, ¬Q, ¬P }.
LEMMA 8. -Let ψ and ψ denote simple Kn-ψ-forms , andψ denote a simple KW-ψ-form.
-ψ |= k ψ if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that M(ψ)σ ⊆ M(ψ ).
-ψ |= kψ if and only if ψ |= k ψ , where ψ is obtained by replacing KW inψ by Kn.
When ψ is a singleton, the entailment is thus achieved in case of subsumption between the main forms of ψ and ψ . In a general case, this Lemma reduces entailment to the existence of a substitution that matches the main form of the entailing Kn-ψ-form ψ onto a subset of clauses of the entailed ψ-form. In case such substitution exists, for each ground instance c of the entailed ψ-form there exists a ground instance in the entailing ψ-form ψ which alone entails c. Thus, the ground instances of ψ never need to be combined together to establish entailment. This property plays a critical role in the efficiency of ψ-form reasoning.
The property critical for the efficiency of reasoning is formulated in Theorem 9 below: given a set of Kn-ψ-forms Ψ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n }, Ψ |= k ψ only if there exists ψ i ∈ Ψ that nearly entails ψ, i.e. main part of ψ i entails the main part of ψ, or
Note that this is a necessary condition only when the domain of objects is assumed to be infinite, which is the assumption that PSIPLAN-S makes.
THEOREM 9. -Given a set of Kn-ψ-forms Ψ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } and a Kn-ψ-form ψ,
Theorem 9 thus requires that to satisfy a ψ-form goal, the planner must find an effect ψ i that nearly entails ψ. But, as exceptions of ψ i weaken it, ψ i alone may not entail the entire ψ. To represent the propositions of ψ which are not entailed, we introduce the e-difference 3 operator.
DEFINITION. -For any two sets of ground propositions A and B, e-difference is defined as follows:
As ψ-forms are compact representations of sets of ground propositions, we extend the e-difference operation to ψ-forms. The algorithms for computing the e-difference between ψ-forms are not presented in this paper, however, we note that they are obtained in a straightforward manner from the corresponding Theorems (see (Babaian et al., 2006) ). The computation is carried out by manipulations on the main form and exceptions of the ψ-forms without expanding the ψ-form into the corresponding set of ground propositions. The following example illustrates the e-difference operation. and thereforeψ
This example demonstrates how e-difference is used in planning to identify the part of a non-ground goalψ that is not implied by the existing knowledge ψ. Indeed, knowing that there are no preferred bibliographies except possibly RI and ACM means no bibliographies except for possibly these two need to be considered, thus reducing the knowledge goalψ to two simpler goalsψ 1 andψ 2 .
The e-difference operator also plays a key role in computing entailment. The next Theorem describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for entailment of a Kn, or KW ψ-form by a set of atoms and Kn-ψ-forms.
DEFINITION. -Set s of Kn and KW-propositions is called saturated if for every Kn(a) and Kn(¬a ∨ ¬a 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬a n ) in s the resolvent Kn(¬a 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬a n ) is also in s.
In other words, s is saturated when the application of rule (R1) does not generate any new propositions not already in s. A saturated equivalent of a set can always be computed by performing all possible such resolutions.
Although computing a saturated equivalent of a set is a relatively computationally expensive operation (see (Babaian et al., 2006) for the algorithm and its analysis), planning with PSIPLAN-S requires that it is performed only once on the initial state and, in a more bounded form, upon executing a sensing action. Execution of a sensing action adds new Kn-atoms and ψ-forms to the the SOK; in such cases the saturation computation is limited to the newly added propositions.
THEOREM 11. -Let s = A ∪ Ψ be a satisfiable saturated set of PSIPLAN-S Kn-atoms (A) and Kn-ψ-forms (Ψ), s |= k ψ if and only if
, and, furthermore,
Clause 1 of the above Theorem specifies that one way of establishing entailment of a singleton KW-ψ-form (i.e. a ψ-form without any variables, i.e. denoting a single ground proposition) is to find a set of corresponding Kn-atoms.
Clause 2 applies to any (singleton or quantified) ψ-form and requires finding a near entailing ψ-form ψ k , followed by checking entailment of the part of ψ that is not entailed by ψ k . Thus, the Theorem describes a recursive procedure for checking entailment. Importantly, each ψ-form in the result of e-difference ψ e − ψ k will have fewer variables than there are in ψ. This factor limits the depth of the recursion tree to the maximum number of variables in a ψ-form.
Overall, the complexity of the entire procedure of checking entailment s |= k ψ is O(β V n), where n is the number of Kn-atoms and ψ-forms in s, V is the maximum number of variables in a ψ-form, and β is the maximum number of ψ-forms in the e-difference. We assume that the cardinality of predicate symbols is constant bounded, and unification takes constant bounded time. We also assume the number of variables, literals and exceptions are all constant bounded. In that case β is also constant bounded, and checking entailment has a linear complexity bound. When the maximum number of exceptions is proportional to n, the procedure's complexity is bound by a polynomial of the degree V + 1.
Adding sensing actions
When sensing actions are added, the planner must reason from a set of propositions which include both Kn and KW ψ-forms. Since the KW-propositions do not contribute to the entailment of Kn-propositions, we consider entailment of only knowledge goals, i.e. KW-ψ-forms.
First, we present an analog of Lemma 8, establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for entailment between two simple KW-ψ-forms. However, to achieve an important property of Kn-ψ-form entailment which follows from Lemma 8 in the case of KW-ψ-form entailment, namely, the fact that each ground proposition of the entailed ψ-form is always entailed by some ground proposition of the entailing ψ-form alone, we must require that the main form of each KW-ψ-form does not contain duplicate predicate symbols. Consider the following example:
No single ground instance of ofψ 1 alone would imply that the value of the disjunction ¬P (A, B) ∨ ¬P (C, D) is known. However, taking two ground instances KW (¬P (A, B) ) and KW (¬P (C, D)) ofψ 1 together allows to conclude that the value of the disjunction ¬P (A, B) ∨ ¬P (C, D) is known, thus together they entail KW (¬P (A, B) ∨ ¬P (C, D)).
LEMMA 13. -Letψ,ψ denote simple KW-ψ-forms without repeated predicate symbols in the main form.ψ |= kψ if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that M(ψ)σ = M(ψ ).
The added ways of proving a KW-ψ-form goal are based on inference rules (R5) and (R6). We precede the formulation of the corresponding Theorem with two examples that illustrate it. EXAMPLE 14. -Rule (R5) essentially states that the value of a disjunction (or conjunction) can be determined from the values of its subclauses. To illustrate the idea, consider the ψ-form goal from the previous example:
The above goal can be achieved by a combination of sensing operators with effects of knowing wether RI is a preferred bibliography ([KW (¬P ref Bib(RI))]), and knowing all papers in collection of the ResearchIndex that are related to keyword Kwrd , which is expressed with a ψ-form [KW (¬InCollection(y, RI) ∨ ¬Rel(y, Kwrd ))].
Another example illustrates application of rule (R6). This rule is based on the fact that the value of a clause c can be determined by resolution between an atom a and the clause ¬a ∨ c. EXAMPLE 15. -Imagine a goal of finding out if paper P was published in journal J, i.e.
[KW (¬P ublished(J, P ))]. Suppose there was a sensing action P ublishedP apersByAuthor(J, A) with the effect [KW (¬P ublished(J, x) ∨ ¬Author(x, A))] identifying all papers by author A published by journal J. If it is known that A is indeed an author of P , i.e. Kn(Author(P, A)), then after executing the P ublishedP apersByAuthor(J, A) action it will be known whether P was published in J, in other words, the goal [KW (¬P ublished(J, P ))] will be achieved.
Differently from the reasoning without sensing, we do not make the completeness case for reasoning about KW-propositions from a set of Kn and KW-propositions, because we have not shown completeness of the ground language L K with respect to this kind of reasoning. However, we believe it to be true, based on the Conjecture on page 11.
THEOREM 16. -Let A denote a set of Kn-atoms {Kn(a 1 ), . . . , Kn(a k )}, Ψ denote a set of Kn-ψ-forms {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ r } andΨ denote a set of KW-ψ-forms {ψ 1 , . . . ,ψ t }. Each KW-ψ-form ofΨ does not have repeated predicate symbols in its main form.
Assume A ∪ Ψ ∪Ψ is satisfiable and saturated. Letψ be a KW-ψ-form without repeated predicate symbols in the main form. Then, A ∪ Ψ ∪Ψ |= kψ if at least one of the following conditions holds:
3) There is a decomposition of the main part ofψ into two subclauses Q and Q such that M(ψ) = Q ∨ Q and
where Σ , Σ are subsets of the set of exceptions ofψ, which only use variables from Q and Q , respectively.
Cases 1 and 2 of this Theorem repeat the conditions of Theorem 11. Cases 3 and 4 describe entailment that involves KW-premises. These entailment methods were demonstrated in Examples 14 and 15.
Unlike the case of only Kn-premises, the completeness of these entailment checking methods is not guaranteed, and their complexity is outside of the polynomial bounds in the number of propositions, since different combinations of KW-ψ-forms and Kn-atoms must be considered to cover cases 3 and 4. In our experience with using the language for planning in the Writer's Aid application, however, this theoretically exponential upper bound did not present a practical problem, due to a small number of cases that required application of cases 3 and 4 of the Theorem.
SOK update after an action and projection
Domain actions cause transitions between the world states. As actions are executed, the agent's SOK must evolve in parallel with the world, and must adequately reflect the changes that occur due to an action. Sensing actions have no effect on the world state, however, the SOK should also be updated with the facts learned upon execution of a sensing action. For the purpose of planning, the agent should have the ability to correctly predict what its state of knowledge would be in case a particular sequence of steps is executed. In this section we present the appropriate PSIPLAN-S operations and discuss their properties.
SOK update. We remind the reader that PSIPLAN-S assumes that action effects are deterministic and that the description of each action is complete and correct, i.e. there are no unknown effects or preconditions.
DEFINITION. -Let w denote a world state and a denote an action that is executable in w. By do(a, w) we denote the world that results from executing a in w. For a set of world states W we define do(a, W ) -a set of worlds resulting from performing action a in any of the world states in W , assuming a is executable in any of the worlds in W , as follows:
Let update(s, a) denote the SOK transition that is caused by an agent with SOK s taking action a. Correctness of an SOK update guarantees that the SOK always correctly represents the actual world model, given a correct initial SOK. The other desirable property of the SOK update is completeness: we would like the agent to maintain all the valid knowledge and take into account the information observed via sensing. The correctness and completeness properties of the SOK update are necessary for a sound and complete planning algorithm.
The correctness and completeness criteria can be formulated in the context of possible worlds. We remind the reader that ∆(a) denotes the set of PSIPLAN-S propositions that are observed as opposed to caused during the execution of an action, thus ∆(a) for a domain action denotes an empty set.
DEFINITION. -We say that the update procedure is correct if and only if
i.e. every possible world after performing the action a has to have a possible predecessor among the worlds in which the propositions that were observed via sensing are true.
The update procedure is complete if and only if do(a, B(s ∪ ∆(a))) ⊆ B(update(s, a))
i.e. every world obtained from a previously possible world in which the propositions that were observed via sensing are true, is accessible from the new SOK.
To achieve correctness of SOK updates, the agent must remove from the SOK all propositions whose truth value might have changed as the result of the performed action. In order to be complete, the agent must also add to the SOK all facts that become known.
To update SOK s after performing a domain action a d all propositions whose truth value could have been changed must be removed from s -these are all propositions entailed by the negation of some effect of a d . The propositions entailed by effects of a d are also removed, and then the effects of a d are added to the new SOK. The agent's SOK after executing a domain action a d in the SOK s is computed as shown below.
where A − (a d ) denotes the set of propositions obtained by negating each domain proposition inside the Kn() in a d 's assert list A(a d ).
EXAMPLE 17. -For an example, consider action a = Download(P, U, D) of downloading file P from url U into directory D. Let precondition P(a) = {Kn(Location(P, U ))} denote that P is located at url U . The effect of this action is that file P is stored in directory D, i.e. A(a) = {Kn(In(P, D))}.
We begin with an SOK s, which states that location of paper P is U , and that A is the only Postscript file in the system. T (x, P S) below denotes that the type of file x is Postscript.
The e-difference s e − A − (a) results in the exception {x = P, y = D} being added to the ψ-form. Further e-difference with A(a) and union with A(a) yields the following SOK
Note that s entailed Kn(¬In(P, D) ∨ ¬T (P, P S)) and that we added the effect Kn (In(P, D) ) when determining s . If our update rule retained Kn(¬In(P, D) ∨ ¬T (P, P S)) as a part of a ψ-form in s , then in s we could perform resolution and conclude that ¬T (P, P S). However, this would be wrong because we have no information on whether or not P is a Postscript file. Instead, our update rule removes any clause that is entailed by ¬In(P, D), and so s does not entail ¬In(P, D) ∨ ¬T (P, P S).
The update (8) produces the same result as Winslett's update operator (Winslett, 1988) in the special case where actions are deterministic. The update is computed without considering all possible worlds corresponding to SOK s explicitly, and thus is efficient.
After the execution of a sensing action a s , the set of observed propositions, denoted below by ∆(a s ) is added to the SOK, i.e.
After propositions from ∆(a) are added to the SOK, all possible resolutions from SOK propositions must be computed and added to the new SOK to keep it saturated.
THEOREM 18. -Assume s is satisfiable and saturated. The following state of knowledge update procedure is correct and complete:
when a is a sensing action.
SOK projection. In order to plan, it is necessary to predict the state of knowledge resulting from executing an action. This is realized using the projection operation, project(s, a). For a domain action, assuming no execution failure, project(s,
For a sensing action projection is different from updating, since it occurs prior to executing the sensing action and no results of sensing are available:
Projection of a sensing action, thus, simply adds the knowledge list to the agent's SOK, establishing that in the future SOK the value of some propositions will become known, without committing to the actual truth value of those propositions. Note that the result of project(a s , s) is not a SOK, since PSIPLAN-S SOKs do not contain KWpropositions. We call the result of projection a projected SOK, or P SOK, denoted s, and apply the Closed Knows Whether Assumption to PSOKs as we do with SOKs:
Note that the result of the projection does not change the set of possible worlds corresponding to the SOK, i.e.
B(project(a s , s)) = B(s),
but it has fewer models, since those models of s that are uncertain about the value of propositions in K(a s ) are not part of the PSOK project(a s , s). (9), and the updated SOK will entailψ 1 (as follows from case 2 of Theorem 16), rendering this goal satisfied.
Related work
Scherl and Levesque (Scherl et al., 1993; Scherl et al., 2003) model the agent's knowledge as an accessibility relation K over the situations (corresponding to worlds in our terminology) and define the set of possible worlds as a set of all K-accessible situations. Scherl and Levesque's formulation of knowing P is expressed in terms of the K relation as follows Know(P, w) = ∀w .K(w, w ) ⇒ w (P ). Thus, the changes in the agent's beliefs are expressed as changes to the K relation in a form of successor-state axioms for the K relation. The successor-state axiom for the K relation is shown to have the following properties (Scherl et al., 2003) :
1) The knowledge producing actions do not change the state of the world. 2) Knowledge is updated appropriately to the effects of an action: only valid knowledge is added (default persistence of ignorance), no valid knowledge is discarded (memory) and all knowledge that becomes available as a result of a sensing action is added.
In our framework the set of possible worlds is modeled using the set B(s), where s is the explicit and finite representation of the agent's knowledge state. Knowing P is defined as s |= k P , because in such case it follows that ∀w ∈ B(s).w(P ). Knowledge updates and projections in PSIPLAN-S are made via application of the update and project operators defined in 8-10. The update and projection operations share the properties of knowledge update of Scherl and Levesque listed in the previous paragraph.
A subset of PSIPLAN-S that does not include KW -propositions and sensing actions is presented in (Babaian et al., 2006) . PSIPLAN-S's use of the modal operators Kn and KW is inspired by the theoretical foundation for representing knowledge and sensing and the solution to the frame problem developed by Scherl and Levesque (Scherl et al., 1993) . Their solution is developed within the framework of the situation calculus (Reiter, 1991) in which general reasoning is not decidable. The goal of PSIPLAN-S is to provide a representation for open world planning with sensing that uses the modal operators Kn and KW (Scherl et al., 1993; Scherl et al., 2003) in a less expressive language for the sake of decidability and tractability.
Liu and Levesque (Liu et al., 2005 ) present a subset of situation calculus (McCarthy et al., 1969; Reiter, 2001 ) with equality with complete and tractable reasoning. The completeness of determining whether a formula φ is true after executing an action is achieved by restricting φ to be in a certain normal form, the knowledge base to a certain proper form and restricting the actions to those with quantifier-free conditional effects. Furthermore, the preconditions of each conditional effect must be known in the knowledge base which describes the situation in which the action is applied. The language of Liu and Levesque does not subsume PSIPLAN-S, however there is some overlap between the two. In particular, while ψ-forms with a single predicate in the main form can be represented in their language, it does not represent ψ-forms in which the main form is a disjunction, e.g. [Kn(¬InCollection(y, ACM ) ∨ ¬Rel(y, Kwrd))]. An example of a statement from their language that cannot be expressed in PSIPLAN-S is a universally quantified positive statement, e.g.: ∀x.P (x) ∨ x = A. However, statements like that do not seem to come up in planning in domains with infinite number of objects.
FLUX (Thielscher, 2005 ) is a framework for programming agent behavior for environments with incomplete information and sensing. Agent programming is different from the problem of automated planning, which is where PSIPLAN-S has been used. FLUX is based on fluent calculus and is implemented as a set of constraints, defining the domain, action update, agent's knowledge and action execution. The constraint language allows linear time evaluation, and includes universally quantified negated clauses, similar to the simple ψ-forms of PSIPLAN-S. However, the domain of objects is assumed to be finite.
ASCP planner (Tu et al., 2007) is based on an extension of the 0-approximation of sensing actions in action language A by (Son et al., 2001) . ASCP encodes the planning problem as a logic program, with the solution plan derived from the logic program's answer set. A includes conditional effects, which are excluded in PSIPLAN-S. While conditional planning within the 0-approximation is shown to be NP-complete, 0-approximation sacrifices the completeness of conditional planning (see also (Babaian et al., 2006) , page 36).
Work by Petrick and Bacchus (Petrick et al., 2002; Petrick et al., 2004) is closely related to PSIPLAN-S's representation. Their knowledge state representation uses propositions similar to PSIPLAN-S's Kn, and KW-propositions, and their sensing actions have KW-effects. While they use quantified propositions like our [KW (Q(x))], but without exceptions, to represent the fact that the agent knows the truth values of all ground instances of [KW (Q(x))], their goals are limited to ground propositions. Their representation is based on the LCW-representation (Etzioni et al., 1997) , which is tractable but incomplete. The LCW representation has also been used in PUCCINI planner (Golden, 1998) . By contrast, in PSIPLAN-S reasoning about domain and knowledge goals from an agent's SOK is complete and tractable, and reasoning from a projected SOK is tractable and, we conjecture, complete.
The action languages in both PUCCINI and planner of Bacchus and Petrick are different from PSIPLAN-S's: there are no universally quantified preconditions, but there are conditional effects of actions. Conditional effects specify propositions that become true if a certain condition holds prior to taking the action. While conditional effects can be easily incorporated in PSIPLAN-S, by excluding conditional effects from PSIPLAN-S actions, we are able to specify exactly the set of propositions whose truth value is changed when executing an action, thus contributing to the tractability of reasoning without having to sacrifice completeness. Planning with conditional effects and without sensing has been shown (e.g. (Turner, 2002; Baral et al., 2000) ) to be outside of the NP class of problems. Such limitations on action specification does not seem to preclude PSIPLAN-S's applicability to some real-life domains, as demonstrated by its use in Writer's Aid (Babaian et al., 2002) .
Conclusions and future work
We have presented PSIPLAN-S, a representation language for reasoning and planning in open world applications with sensing. Several distinguishing features are critical for PSIPLAN-S's suitability in practice.
-PSIPLAN-S is based on a language of knowledge propositions L k , which was carefully designed to support sound and complete reasoning about domain and knowledge goals from the agent's state of knowledge.
-PSIPLAN-S introduces a novel Closed Knows Whether Assumption to represent the agent's ignorance. Verifying an agent's ignorance about a proposition is a necessary component of ensuring non-redundant sensing.
-To represent statements that are quantified over the entire domain of discourse, PSIPLAN-S uses ψ-forms, which represent infinite sets of propositions of L K . Completeness of reasoning from an agent's SOK in PSIPLAN-S follows from the same properties of reasoning in L K and ψ-forms.
-PSIPLAN-S's SOK update after an action completely and correctly reflects the transition due to an action without expanding the SOK into the set of possible worlds. Although we have not shown it here, the update procedure has polynomial complexity in the number of propositions in SOK (Babaian et al., 2006) .
-PSIPLAN-S's projection operator predicts the future SOK and serves as a basis for planning with sensing actions.
Thus, PSIPLAN-S efficiently handles domains with an incomplete specification of the initial state without considering the set of all possible worlds, and does not require that the agent know the set of all objects in the domain. In the future, we will extend PSIPLAN-S to allow function symbols. Another interesting and important task is proving the completeness of the rule system for L K .
Proofs
We restate all propositions here for convenience. PROPOSITION 1.-Let p 1 , . . . , p n , q be domain propositions:
PROOF. -(⇒) First, suppose the set of propositions {(p 1 , . . . , p n } is unsatisfiable, i.e. has an empty set of models. Then, according to Definitions (2.3)- (2. 3), so is the set {Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n )}, so the statement is true.
When {(p 1 , . . . , p n } is a satisfiable set, p 1 , . . . , p n |= q means that for every world w such that w(p 1 ), . . . , w(p n ) we have w(q). Let (w, W ) be a model for Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n ). Then, according to Definitions (2.3)-(2.3), for all worlds w in W , we have w(p 1 ), . . . , w(p n ). Hence for all w in W , we have w(q). Therefore (w, W ) is a model of Kn(q).
(⇐) First, suppose the set of propositions {Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n )} is unsatisfiable. Then, there is no world w such that w(p 1 ), . . . , w(p n ), because otherwise (w, {w}) would be a model for Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n ). Therefore, {p 1 , . . . , p n } is also unsatisfiable and the statement holds true. Now consider the case where {Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n )} is a satisfiable set. Suppose that Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n ) |= k Kn(q), but p 1 , . . . , p n |= q. The latter means that there is a world w such that w(p 1 ), . . . , w(p n ), but not w(q). Then, a k-state (w, {w}) is a model for Kn(p 1 ) . . . Kn(p n ), but not for Kn(q). We arrive at a contradiction. PROOF. -The if parts of claims 1-3 of this proposition are easily verified using the definitions of the set of models α() and entailment in Section 2.3. It is only left to prove the only if part. In all cases the proof is by contradiction. We show that if the assertion of each case of the theorem does not hold, there exists a model of the premise, that is not a model of the conclusion.
1. Suppose Kn(a) |= k KW (c), but c = ¬a. Assume c = ¬b 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬b r , where r ≥ 1 and a = b i for at least one value of i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Let γ 0 be a k-state (w , {w , w }) such that w (a), w (a), w (b i ) and w (¬b i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that a = b i . γ 0 ∈ α(Kn(a)) and γ 0 ∈ α(KW (c)), which implies that Kn(a) |= k KW (c). We arrived at a contradiction.
Suppose
Kn(c ) |= k KW (c), but c ⊆ c. The latter implies there exists a disjunct ¬a of c , which is not a disjunct of c. Assume c = ¬b 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬b r , where r ≥ 1. Let γ 0 be a k-state (w , {w , w }) such that w (¬a), w (¬a), w (b i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and w (¬b i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Clearly, γ 0 ∈ α(Kn(c )) and γ 0 ∈ α(KW (c)), which implies that Kn(c ) |= k KW (c). We arrived at a contradiction.
where the set {a 1 , . . . , a r , c 1 , . . . , c n } is satisfiable, c = ¬a i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and there is no c ⊆ c such that s |= k Kn(c ).
We first address the case when n = 0, i.e. there are no Kn() formulas over clauses of negated atoms in s. Then, item (3.b) in the formulation of the proposition is not applicable, because, based on Proposition 1, there would be no clauses of negated atoms c such that s |= k Kn(c ). Assuming the assertion (3.a) of this Proposition does not hold, c is is not composed entirely of negations of atoms a 1 , . . . , a r , and therefore the set of literals ¬b p in c that are not one of ¬a 1 , . . . , ¬a r is not empty. Let b 1 , . . . , b p denote all literals of c that are not a 1 , . . . , a r . Let's now construct a k-state γ 0 = (w , {w , w }) where w (a i ), w (a i ), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and set w (b i ) and w (¬b i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p. It's easy to see that γ 0 is a model of s, but not of KW (c).
In case n > 0, let c 1 , . . . c v be the set of all clauses that can be obtained from {a 1 , . . . , a r , c 1 , . . . , c n } by unit clause resolution rule, plus those clauses from C = {c 1 , . . . , c n } that do not contain negations of any atoms from A = {a 1 , . . . , a r }, i.e. do not produce a resolution with any atom from A. According to Proposition 1 and the fact that deduction from a satisfiable set in L D is complete under unit clause resolution and subsumption, for any c such that s |= k Kn(c ), there must be c i ⊆ c . Assuming the assertion (3.b) of this Proposition does not hold, c i ⊆ c, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r; Note that each c i is a non-empty clause, since s is satisfiable. Furthermore, assume c i = ¬d
Note that D does not contain any negated atoms from A.
If (3.a) does not hold, then c is not comprised of any subset of clauses ¬a 1 , . . . , ¬a r . Let's now construct a k-state γ 0 = (w , {w , w }) which is a model of s, but not of a model of KW (c).
2) w (¬d) and w (¬d) for all atoms d such that ¬d ∈ D and ¬d ⊆ c, 3) w (¬e) and w (e) for any other atom e that has not been given a value.
γ 0 is a model of s, because it's a model for all Kn(a i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ r due to step 1 in the construction above. γ 0 is a model of Kn(c j ), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, because for each c j at least one of its disjuncts will be assigned a value by application of step 2. Furthermore, γ 0 is not a model of KW (c), because all of atoms participating in c will be assigned a value by a combination of steps 1 or 3, and at least one atom of c will be assigned a value by step 3, resulting in w (c) and w (¬c). We have to prove that KW (c 1 ), . . . , KW (c n ) |= k KW (c) only if there is a subset of clauses c 1 , . . . , c n that together contain all and only disjuncts of c. Suppose there's no such subset, i.e. for all such subsets {c i1 , . . . , c im }, c i1 ∨ . . . ∨ c im = c. We will construct a model γ 0 = (w , {w , w }) of KW (c 1 ), . . . , KW (c n ) that is not a model of KW (c), thus contradicting the entailment. First, let's use C to denote the set {c 1 , . . . , c n }, and consider those clauses from C that contain at least one disjunct that does not appear in c. Let's denote the set of these clauses C 1 , and let A 1 denote the set of all atoms of c 1 , . . . , c n that do not appear in c. Let
Thus, γ 0 = (w , {w , w }) is a model of KW (c i ) for all c i ∈ C 1 , since w (c i ) and w (c i ).
Next, consider the rest of the clauses from C, i.e. the set C 2 = C\C 1 . Let A 2 denote the set of all atoms of clauses in C 2 . Let
Thus, γ 0 = (w , {w , w }) is a model of KW (c j ) for all c j ∈ C 2 , since w (¬c j ) and w (¬c j ).
At this point, there are atoms of c whose values remain unassigned. Otherwise, if all atoms of c were assigned, since no atoms of A 1 appear in c it would mean that c consists entirely from atoms in A 2 . Since each clause of C 2 is subsumed by c, it would follow that c equals to some subset of clauses in C 2 . Let a be some still unassigned atom of c, and let w (a) and w (¬a).
and let all the other unassigned atoms be assigned true in both w and w , i.e.
w (e) and w (e), for all e = a, e ∈ A 2 ∪ A 1 .
At this point, worlds w , w and thus γ 0 are completely specified. γ 0 is not a model of KW (c), because w (c), yet w (¬c). To prove the only if part we present below informal sketch of a derivation of KW (c) from s = {Kn(p 1 ), . . . , Kn(p m )} using the specified above rules of inference.
Observe that case 3 of Proposition 2 implies Kn(p 1 ), . . . , Kn(p m ) |= k KW (c) if and only if PROOF. -1).if part. Let Kn(c ) be an arbitrary ground instance of ψ , i.e. Kn(c ) = M(ψ)σ for some σ . Consider ground instance Kn(c) of ψ, such that Kn(c) = M(ψ)σσ . Since M(ψ)σ ⊆ M(ψ ) and Kn(c ) = M(ψ )σ , therefore c ⊆ c , and therefore by Proposition 1 Kn(c) |= k Kn(c ). We have shown that for any ground instance Kn(c ) of ψ there is a ground instance of ψ, which entails Kn(c ), thus proving ψ |= k ψ .
only if part. Suppose ψ |= k ψ , yet there is no substitution σ as described in the condition of the Lemma. We will show that this yields a contradiction by constructing a model of of ψ that is not a model of ψ .
When ψ is not a singleton, let Kn(c ) be an instance of M(ψ ), which is obtained by assigning to each variable of ψ a constant value which does not occur anywhere in M(ψ). Let's call these constant symbols special constants. Since the domain is infinite, special constants can always be found.
for every d k and w(¬a) for all other atoms. Clearly, w(c ) is false and therefore γ 0 is not a model of ψ . On the other hand, unless at least one of ground instances of ψ consists entirely of a subset of literals ¬d k of c , γ 0 would be a model of ψ. Suppose that ψ indeed defines a ground instance c = M(ψ)σ 0 such that c ⊆ c , but then it is possible to construct a substitution σ such that M(ψ)σ ⊆ M(ψ ), violating our assumption. σ is constructed from σ 0 by replacing each special constant by a variable of ψ , which is bound to that constant by σ 0 . We have reached a contradiction.
The case of a singleton ψ , let c = M(ψ ) and repeat the argument of the above paragraph.
2) if part. For an arbitrary ground instance KW (c ) ofψ there exists a corresponding ground instance Kn(c ) of ψ , and Kn(c ) |= k KW (c ). Thus, ψ |= k ψ implies ψ |= kψ .
only if part. The proof is similar to the one from part 1. We derive a contradiction by constructing a model of of ψ that is not a model ofψ .
Whenψ is a singleton, the statement of the Lemma follows from part 1 of this Lemma and Proposition 1. Whenψ is not a singleton, let KW (c ) be a ground instance of M(ψ ) constructed by instantiating all variables ofψ with constant values which do not occur anywhere in M(ψ). Suppose c = ¬d k . . . ∨ . . . ¬d k . Consider γ 0 = (w , {w , w }) such that -w (d k ) for every d k of c , and w (¬a) for all other atoms, and -w (¬a) for all atoms a, including d 1 , . . . , d k Clearly, w (c ) is false, while w (c ) is true, and therefore γ 0 is not a model of KW (c ) and thus not a model ofψ . From here on we reach a contradiction by applying the same argument as in part 1 of this proof. The only if part. First, suppose ψ is a singleton [KW (¬d 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬d m )]. Suppose that A = {Kn(a 1 ), . . . , Kn(a n )} and {Kn(d 1 ), . . . , Kn(d m )} ⊆ A. Let γ = (w , {w , w }) such that -w (a 1 ), . . . , w (a n ), and w (¬a) for any other atom a, -w (a 1 ), . . . , w (a n ), w (d 1 ), . . . , w (d m ), and w (¬a) for any other atom a.
Note that w = w . γ ∈ α(A ∪ Ψ) unless there exists a ground Kn(c) ∈ Ψ such that c consists of a subset of negated atoms a 1 , . . . , a n , d 1 , . . . , d m . Since A ∪ Ψ is satisfiable, in such case c must contain negated atoms from d 1 , . . . , d m that are different from a 1 , . . . , a n . Since A ∪ Ψ is saturated, c cannot contain atoms from a 1 , . . . , a n . Thus, γ ∈ α(A ∪ Ψ) unless there exists a ground Kn(c) ∈ Ψ such that c consists of a subset of negated atoms d 1 , . . . , d m that are different from a 1 , . . . , a n .
If there is such a clause Kn(c) ∈ Ψ, then Kn(c) |= k Kn(¬d 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬d m ) and therefore Kn(c) |= k ψ, thus s |= k ψ and it is easy to see that condition 2 of the theorem holds. Otherwise, γ ∈ α(A ∪ Ψ) yet γ ∈ α(ψ), because ¬d 1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬d m is true in w , but false in w . We have reached a contradiction with the fact that s |= k ψ.
Next, consider the case when ψ is not a singleton KW-ψ-form. If ψ is a singleton Kn-ψ-form, condition 2 of this Theorem trivially follows from Theorem 9. Finally, in case ψ is not a singleton, we first show the existence of ψ k such that [M(ψ k )] |= k [M(ψ)]. Assuming there is no such ψ k ∈ s, i.e. by Lemma 8 no ψ k ∈ s such that M(ψ k ) subset matches M(ψ), we construct a ground instance of ψ using a substitution that binds each variable of ψ to a unique constant which does not appear anywhere in the main form or exceptions of all ψ-forms of Ψ, ψ and atoms of A. Following a similar argument as the one used in the proof of Lemma 8, it is easy to show that this ground instance is not entailed by s unless there is a substitution σ that subset matches some M(ψ k ) onto M(ψ). Thus, there is ψ k ∈ Ψ such that [M(ψ k )] |= k [M(ψ)]. Furthermore, since the exceptions of ψ k weaken it, the e-difference ψ e − ψ k must be also entailed by s, i.e. it is necessary that s − {ψ k } |= k (ψ e − ψ k ).
LEMMA 13.-Letψ,ψ denote simple KW-ψ-forms without repeated predicate symbols in the main form.ψ |= kψ if and only if there exists a substitution σ such that M(ψ)σ = M(ψ ).
PROOF. -if part proof trivially follows from Proposition 3.
only if part. Whenψ is a singleton, given thatψ,ψ have no repeated predicate symbols, Proposition 3 implies there is a single ground instance ofψ that equals the singletonψ thus proving the statement of this Lemma.
Whenψ is not a singleton, the proof is by contradiction. We pick a ground instance KW (c) ofψ by instantiating all variables ofψ to different constant values that do not appear inψ andψ. Assuming the statement of the Lemma is not true, we show that such KW (c) is not entailed byψ by constructing a model γ ofψ that is not a model of KW (c), unless there is a ground instance ofψ that is the same as KW (c), in which case a substitution σ such that M(ψ)σ = M(ψ ) can be found.
Let γ = (w , {w , w }), where -w (d), w (d), for those atoms d that appears both in c and in some ground instance ofψ.
At this point not all of the atoms of c are assigned values by w , w . Otherwise, it would follow that there exist ground instances ofψ that together contain all atoms of c. Furthermore, sinceψ,ψ do not have any repeated predicate symbols, there exists a single ground instance ofψ equal to KW (c ) and therefore we could construct a substitution σ such that M(ψ)σ = M(ψ ) as done in the end of proof of part 1, Lemma 8.
Thus, there exists at least one atom of c that does not appear in any ground instance of M(ψ). Let's call it a and set -w (a), w (¬a), for some atom a that appears in c and does not appear in any ground instance ofψ.
Furthermore, let's set
